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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Defendant/Appellant appeals from rulings made preliminary to
and at the course of a trial held in the Sixth Judicial District
Court for Wayne County which resulted in a jury verdict on February
27, 1989, and from the Denial of the following Post-trial Motions:
(1)

Motion for New Trial - Filed April 18, 1989, and

the Order denying said Motion entered on July 14, 1989; and
(2)

Motion in Arrest of Judgment - Filed July 17,

1989, and the Order entered denying said

Motion on July 14, 1989.

The Notice of Appeal dated July 14, 1989, was filed
with this Court on September 5, 1989.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal of rulings made preliminary to and
at the course of a trial held in the Sixth Judicial Court of Wayne
County,

and

from

a

denial

of

Post-trial

Motions.

Defendant/Appellant was charged with 8 separate counts of theft of
cattle, and convicted by a jury on February 27, 1989.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The

issues

presented

by

the

Appeal

expressed

in

terms

and

circumstances of the case are set forth as follows:
Issue No. lf Juror Bias and Improper Conduct:Should a
new trial be granted in view of the fact that one of the jurors
was a close friend and former employee of one of the key witnesses
and alleged owner of the cattle, and that one of the jurors had
previously arrested one of the witnesses for an identical offense.
Should a new trial be granted because some jurors had been seen
speaking to witnesses during the recess of the trial.
Issue No. 2, Separate Offenses:

Was the fact that

multiple charges were filed and the Defendant/Appellant was found
guilty

of

multiple

claims

error

and

prejudicial

to

the

Defendant/Appellant's rights in view of the fact that only one
group of 8 head of cattle were referred to during the course of the
trial and in the indictment, and that separate elements of intent
were not alleged or proven, and that the alleged offenses should
all have been included in one count.
Issue No.

3, Denial

of

Equal Protection:

Is the

charging statute, Utah Code Ann. 76-6-412 unconstitutional on the
basis that it denies the Defendant/Appellant equal protection under
the law in that it establishes the alleged crime of which the
Defendant/Appellant was charged as a felony without reference to
the specific

value of the items referred to, whereas the remaining

provisions of the section require certain monetary limits in order
to qualify for the various levels of felony convictions.
5

Issue No, 4, Venue:

Did the Court improperly deny the

Defendant/Appellant's Motion for Change of Venue in that all
residents

of the small community

of Loa, in which the trial

occurred, were essentially aware of the case through

pre-trial

publication and rumors which were widely disseminated throughout
the entire community and county.
Issue No, 5, Opinion Testimony:

Was it improper to admit

testimony of Clyde B. Argyle and A.C, Ekker over the objection of
the Defendant/Appellant through his counsel because it was based
on hearsay, there was lack of foundation, and inadequate

basis

for an opinion?
Issue No. 6, Business Records:
Plaintiff's
hearsay

Was it improper to admit

Exhibit 2 into evidence under a business

record

exception when the only identification of such records

was by the brand

inspector

who was not

an employee

of

the

stockyard and had no personal knowledge of the operation of the
business?
Issue No. 7, Requirement of Original:

Was

it improper

to

admit Plaintiff's Exhibits 3 and 6 for lack of foundation as the
originals were easily obtainable?
Issue No. 8, Improper Closing Remarks:

Should a reversal be

granted on the basis of improper remarks made by the prosecution
in

his

closing

Defendant/Appellant

statement

to

the

effect

that

the

was not only guilty of this crime but a

number of other crimes for which he should be punished?
Issue No. 9,Irrelevant Testimony:

Was it improper to admit

testimony of A.C. Ekker as to previous reports and apprehensions
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for lack of relevancy?
Issue No, 10, Sentencing:

Was there an improper sentenc-

ing procedure in that the same judge who tried the case did not
impose the sentence when he either was or would have soon been
available to impose the sentence.
upon evidence

which

was beyond

reasonably been considered

Did the sentencing judge rely
the scope

which

should

have

in view of statements made by the

claimed owner of the cattle at the sentencing that rustling by
airplanes

had

problem, and
punished

occurred

in the area, that

that this Defendant/Appellant

as an example

to other

parties

it was

a

serious

should be harshly

to prevent

airplane

rustling?
Issue
indictment:

No.

11,

Insufficiency

of

and

Variance

of

Is some evidence as to the time of taking required

to be provided either in the indictment or at the trial so as to
allow the Defendant/Appellant to be able to defend himself on due
process grounds, and should the Defendant/Appellant's conviction
be reversed in the absence of any such evidence in view of the
fact that the Defendant/Appellant

gave evidence

as to alibi,

which imposed upon the state a higher burden than it would otherwise have had to then come forward with a specific time of taking
other, than during the period when the Defendant/Appellant had an
alibi as to his whereabouts?

When evidence at the trial revealed

a corporation allegedly owned the cattle, did that constitute a
variance?

7

Issue No, 12, Prior Bad Acts: The

Defendant/Appellant

was

originally charged with fraudulently uttering and altering title
to cattle, which charge was dismissed prior to the trial.

In

view of this dismissal was it prejudicial to allow testimony in
during the trial concerning said instrument over the objection of
Defendant/Appellant's counsel when there was no issue before the
court on this question.
Issue No. 13:

With respect to each evidentiary question the

issue arises as to whether or not the prejudicial

effect

out-

weighed its probative value and, if so, whether or not the admission of said evidence was likely to have had a material effect on
the outcome of the trial.
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Amendment V,

Constitution of the United States.

Amendment VI, Constitution of the United States.
Amendment VIII, Constitution of the United States.
Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States.
Article I, Section VII, Constitution of Utah.
Article I, Section IX, Constitution of Utah.
Article I, Section XII, Constitution of Utah.
Article I, Section XXIV, Constitution of Utah.
Rule 59 (a)(2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 78-13-9 (2) Utah Code Annotated.
Section 76-6-412 Utah Code Annotated.
Section 76-1-401 Utah Code Annotated.
Rules

17, 18, 19, 24 and 29

(e)(i) and

(ii) , Utah Ru

Criminal Procedure.
Rules 402, 403, 404(b), 701, 802, Utah Rules of Evidence.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.Nature of the Case:

This is an appeal of rulings made

preliminary to and at the course of a trial held in the Sixth
Judicial Court of Wayne County, and from a denial of Post-trial
Motions.

Defendant/Appellant was charged with 8 separate counts

of theft of cattle, and convicted by a jury on February 27, 1989.
B.Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court:
information

was

filed

by

the

Wayne

County

District

An

Attorney

charging the Defendant/Appellant with 8 separate counts of theft
of cattle pursuant to Section 76-6-412, Utah Code Ann.

Numerous

Pre-trial Motions were made by both parties to the matter, the most
significant of which for purposes of this appeal are the Motions
for Change of Venue, to allege one third degree felony and to
Suppress Evidence, all of said motions having been denied.

The

trial was conducted regularly except that bias of certain jurors
were not revealed at voir dire, jurors were seen talking with the
prosecution's key witness during the course of the trial, several
exhibits

and

Prosecutor

testimony

made

were

improper

allowed

remarks

in

over
his

objection,
closing

and

the

argument.

Defendant/Appellant was convicted by the jury on all 8 counts, was
sentenced a fine of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00, Thirty-five
Thousand ($35,000.00) of which was suspended), restitution in the
amount of One Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars and Thirty-three Cents
($1,717.33) , a suspended prison sentence, and one year in the Wayne
10

County

Jail with probation.

Defendant/Appellant's

Motion

for

Arrest of Judgment based upon the late amendment to the information
was denied, as was the Defendant/Appellantfs Motion for New Trial.
The Notice of Appeal was filed with this Court on September 5,
1989.
C.

Relevant Facts:

1.

On March 11, 1987, Defendant/Appellant brought 8 head of

cattle to the Spanish Fork Livestock Auction for the purpose
of selling them.

See Trial Transcript page 191. 2.

Ever

since the Lindsays have been married, they have raised horses
and cows.
3.

See page 166 of the Trial Transcript.

The cows were utilized for the purpose of training horses.

See page 167 of the Trial Transcript.
4.

The cattle were small, had long horns, did not have any

tags, were unbranded, and had red sand on their back.

See

page 106 of the Trial Transcript.
5.

Mr. Argyle testified in the preliminary hearing that red

sand could appear in three different regions in Utah.

See

Reply to State's Memorandum, Paragraph 4 at page 4 5 of the
Record.
6.

Dependant/Appellant testified there was brownish red sand

in

and

about

his

property.

See page

224

of

the

Trial

Transcript.
7. Mr. A. C. Ekker testified that based on conversations with
another party who was not present as a witness, it was his
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opinion that the cattle were his. See page 86-87 of the Trial
Transcript.
8.

Mr. Ekker never saw the cattle.

See page 92 of the Trial

Transcript.
9.

The sheriff of Wayne County is the cousin of the alleged

victim.

One of the jurors had worked for the alleged victim,

and another juror was previously a law enforcement officer who
had actually arrested one of the witnesses in the case, Don
Hatch, for the identical things which the Defendant was found
guilty.

See Defendant/Appellant's Supplement for Motion for

New Trial, paragraph 3 of page 250 of the Record.
10.

Two of the jurors conversed with A. C. Ekker during the

course of the trial.

See Trial Transcript, page 302 and

Supplement to Motion for New Trial, paragraph 3 of page 250
of the Record.
11.

The prosecution, despite repeated demands, failed to

amend the information to allege the time of taking.

See

Response to Demand for Place, Date and Time of Offenses, pages
60-61 of the Record.
12.

The

concerning

prosecution,
prior

Defendant/Appellant.

in closing, made
criminal

acts

improper

remarks

committed

by

See Supplement to Motion for New Trial

page 249-252 of the Record, and Transcript of said Motion,
page 18.
13.

The evidence in the trial indicated the ownership of the

alleged stolen cattle was not the same as in the information,
12

but

was

a different

entity.

See

page

67

of

the

Trial

Transcript.
14.

The various

objections made to the

introduction

of

certain exhibits and testimony are cited to the Record in the
appropriate arguments set fort 1 below.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant/Appellant was wrongfully convicted by a biased jury
some of whom had spoke to a prosecution's key witness during the
course of the proceedings, for 8 separate counts of livestock theft
of unbranded cattle.

The information did not state the time of

taking, and was amended late in the proceedings to include the true
alleged owner of the unbranded cattle.

Defendant/Appellant was

somewhat of an outsider to the small ranching communities of Wayne
County, there had been previous reports of thefts in the area, and
word had spread about the community concerning the thefts making
the formation of an impartial jury very difficult.

Although the

alleged theft constituted one criminal episode, Defendant/Appellant
was denied equal protection under the law by being convicted on 8
separate counts. Certain evidence was admitted over objection that
alluded to other offenses which charges were dismissed by the
Circuit

Court,

and

certain

without

proper

foundation

hearsay,
was

lay

admitted

opinion
over

and

evidence

objection.

The

sentencing procedure was improper in that another Judge conducted
the hearing and imposed the sentence, and may have wrongfully
relied on evidence of other types of theft to excessively punish
Defendant/Appellant as an example.
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ARGUMENT
I.

Change of Venue:

Defendant/Appellant
Change of Venue.

Pursuant to Rule 29(e), U.R. Cr. Proc.

filed

a Motion

supported

by Affidavit

for

Loa is a very small, basically ranching

community in Wayne County where the alleged victim was well known
and respected.

Defendant/Appellant was new to the area and was

somewhat of an outsider.

Previous thefts of cattle had been widely

reported in the area, and was a cause of great concern in the
ranching community.

On voir

dire, several of the jurors admitted

hearing rumors about the thefts, one was dismissed because, based
on the rumors, she thought the Defendant/Appellant was guilty, and
many of the jurors had

prior dealings with the Prosecutor.

Given

these factors, it was an abuse of discretion of the Trial Court not
to grant

the Motion for Change of Venue.

A Motion for Change of Venue was extensively reviewed and
granted in State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah, 1989).

The Court

labeled four factors to be taken into consideration:
l.The standing of the victim and the accused in the Community;
2.The size of the community;
3.The nature and gravity of the offense;
4.The nature and extent of publicity.
The

Court

noted

that

it

must

"take

the

totality

of

the

circumstances into account" (i.d. at P. 552).
As previously stated, Defendant/Appellant was somewhat of an
outsider, not having lived in the area for that many years, whereas
the alleged victim was well respected in the community as belonging
15

to a cattle raising family for several generations.

Immediately

a

eyes

presumption

was

raised

in

the

community

that

Defendant/Appellant must be guilty.
Loa is a very small community consisting mostly of cattle and
agricultural enterprises. The Court in James cited a U. S. Supreme
Court Case, Nebraska Press Association vs. Stewart, 427 U. S. 539,
49 L.Ed. 683 (1976) indicating the smaller the community the more
likely there will be a need for a change in venue.

The apparent

bias of some of the jurors (argued supra), substantiates that a
fair and impartial jury would be nearly impossible for a crime such
as this in an agricultural community such as Loa.

One of the

jurors was a former employee of the alleged victim, another juror
was a former police officer who arrested an alleged accomplice of
Defendant/Appellant, and other jurors were friends of the alleged
victim.

The community the Court was considering in the James case

was Logan, which is immensely more populous than the community at
issue here.
As to the nature and gravity of the offense, cattle theft in
a community where much of its economic support is based on cattle
raising becomes a much more serious offense than the total value
of the alleged stolen property

($1,717.33) indicates.

Even the

prosecution in the sentencing argued that due to the geography of
the area, which makes policing the cattle very difficult, it is
indeed a serious offense.
page 6.

See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing,

Mr. A. C. Ekker also testified at the sentencing hearing
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indicating that such an offense should be taken very seriously (Id,
pages 8 and 9) .
As already stated, there had been previous thefts and trials
concerning

livestock thefts in the region, of which the whole

community was aware of.

Evidence was introduced to the Trial Court

that a man who was present at the preliminary hearing was surprised
to find that most people, including Court personnel, had already
deemed Defendant/Appellant to be guilty.

See Affidavit in Support

of Motion to Change Venue, Pages 83-85 of the Record.

Several of

the jurors admit knowing of previous cattle thefts in the areas
that, coupled with the fact that Defendant/Appellant did not have
particularly high standing in the community, and was connected with
a convicted cattle rustler, raised presumptions in most of the
jurors minds that the Defendant/Appellant was guilty.
The Court in James,finding all of the above factors present,
ruled a Motion for Change of Venue should have been granted by the
Trial Court, and it was an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court
not to do so.

A summary review of the trial transcript will show

that this was small town justice, inflicted upon an outsider, and
constitutes a violation of Defendant/Appellant's

constitutional

rights contained in Amendment VI to the Constitution of the United
States, and Article I, Sections 7, 10 and 12 of the Constitution
of Utah.

II.
87

of

Improper Admission of Opinion Testimony:
the

Trial

Transcript,
17

A.

C.

Ekker

On page 86 and
testified

over

Defendant/Appellant's objection, that based on conversations with
another party who was not present as a witness, it was his opinion
that the cattle were his.

On page 92 of the transcript, Mr. Ekker

indicated that opinion was based entirely upon what he was told by
someone else and that he never saw the cattle.

Similarly, Mr.

Argyle testified on Page 108, over Defendant/Appellantfs objection,
that it was his opinion that the cattle must have come from the
Robbers Roost Allotment, although at the preliminary hearing, Mr.
Argyle had testified red sand could have come from 3 different
regions.

See Reply to State's Memorandum, paragraph 4, at page 45

of the Record.

Mr. Argyle also indicated this opinion was based

upon a conversation with another person who was not present as a
witness, and that he had never seen cattle of this particular type
before.

Neither of these witnesses were certified as experts by

the prosecution.
Said opinions should have been excluded for two reasons, (1)
they were based on hearsay; and (2) they went beyond the limited
scope

that

opinions.

Rule

701, Utah

Rules

of

Evidence

imposes

on

lay

Both witnesses testified their opinion was based on

conversations with other persons who were available, but were not
present in the Courtroom for cross examination.
principal

behind

the

hearsay

rule

(Rule

The fundamental

802, Utah

Rules

of

Evidence),is so an accusedfs rights to cross-examine witnesses will
not be infringed upon.

Both witnesses drew an inference as to

where the cattle came from based on the mere unsubstantiated fact
that there was red sand on the cattle.
18

The Defendant/Appellant

gave testimony on page 227 of the Trial Transcript that the cattle
were standing in reddish-brown sand.

This Court should certainly

take judicial notice that red sand appears in literally thousands
of acres range land in different areas throughout the state and the
region, and is not limited only to the vicinity of the Robbers
Roost Allotment.
In the matter of the Hockf s Estate, 655 P. 2d 1111, (Utah 1982), the Court recognized that admission of evidence based on
hearsay

was

error.

Although

the Court did

find that

it was

harmless error, because it was not relevant to an ultimate issue
in the case, in this matter it was extremely relevant as to where
the cattle came from, because, as argued

infra, the community

including the jury were concerned with cattle thefts in the area
and thought they were protecting one of its leading and respected
cattle operators.

A. C. Ekker was not even aware and did not

report that any of this group of cattle were stolen.

See Trial

Transcript pages 77, 78. Certainly the opinions of an owner who had
not even seen the cattle, and a brand inspector who admittedly
based

his

opinion

on

the

conversation

with

another

man,

constitutes prejudicial error requiring reversal.
Rule 701 limits opinion testimony by lay witnesses to those
which are:
Both

!l a

( ) rationally based on perception of the witness . . "

the witnesses

opinions were

not rationally

based

on the

perception of that witness, because they were admittedly based on
conversations with other persons.

In Edwards vs. Didericksen, 597

P.2d 1328 (Utah, 1979) and in Highland Constr. Co. vs. Pac. R.R.,
19

683 P.2d

1042

(Utah, 1984), the Court reaffirmed the rule that

opinion testimony may not be based

on hearsay

evidence.

The

combined affect of both these witnesses opinions was prejudicial
to Defendant/Appellant and again constitutes reversible error.

III.

Improper Admission of Business Records:

On page 103 of

the trial transcript Defendant/Appellant objected to the admission
of Plaintiff's Exhibit Number Two, in that it was a business record
from a company that the witness was not an employee of and had no
personal knowledge of.

State vs. Bertul, 664 P. 2d 1181 (Utah,

1983) held that for evidence to be admissible as a business record
a

proper

foundation

must

be

laid

to

establish

the

necessary

induciae of reliability, which foundation should generally include
the following:
The record must be made in the regular course of the
business or entity which keeps the records; the record
must have been made at the time of, or in close proximity
to, the occurrence of a conclusion that after recordation
the document was kept under circumstances that would
preserve its integrity; the sources of the information
from which the entry was made and the circumstances of
the preparation of the document were such that to suggest
its trustworthiness.
There can be no question that Mr. Argyle could not possibly
testify to all of those factors required by Bertul.

The Court

stated no reason for overruling Defendant/Appellant's objection.
Clearly there was lack of proper foundation for admitting Exhibit
Number

Two,

but

if

the

Court

finds

the

admission

alone

was

insufficient to cause prejudicial error, the Court must keep in

20

mind that the combined affect of all the errors pointed out in this
brief

warrant

a reversal

of the conviction.

See also

Gold

Laboratories Inc. vs. Lewis A. Rosar Co., 589 P.2d. 756 (Utah,
1978).
IV.

Irrelevant and Prejudicial Testimony:

On page 83 of the

trial transcript, A. C. Ekker, over objection, testified as to
previously reporting other cattle thefts, and that others have been
apprehended for cattle rustling.

Being such a small community, it

was well known that Don Hatch, with whom it was widely rumored that
Defendant/Appellant was a co-conspirator, was previously convicted
of cattle rustling from the same area.

Those questions allowed

over objection gave rise to an inference that if Don Hatch was
guilty then certainly the Defendant/Appellant was guilty.
improper

inference

brought

about by

irrelevant

and

Such

misleading

questions was extremely prejudicial, and warrants reversal.
Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence preclude the
introduction of irrelevant evidence, and evidence whose probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury.

In Pearce vs.

Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah,1985), the Court stated,
where evidence was shown to have supported only
conjectural inferences which had little probative value,
or where no evidence was introduced that showed that fact
had any causal connection with Plaintiff's injury,
reviewing Courts have reversed cases on grounds that they
improperly admitted evidence could only have served to
confuse or mislead the jury or prejudice the outcome of
the case (citations omitted).

21

The Court engaged in thorough analysis of balancing the probative
value against undue prejudice, citing Carlson vs. Piper Aircraft
Corp. , 646 P.2d 43 (OR, 1982) and Patricia R. vs. Sulivan, 631 P.2d
91 (Alaska,1981), and concluded: "the instant case was similarly
fraught with the danger of dogmatic judgment." A small town jury
was eager to protect themselves and their community from cattle
rustling, and when reminded of previous convictions and reports of
cattle

theft,

would

tend

to

link

the

prior

instances

to

Defendant/Appellants conduct and thereby raise the inference of
guilt.
that

State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583 (Utah, 1984), which ruled

the

introduction

of

evidence

concerning

a prior

robbery

committed by the Defendant twenty minutes before his arrest for
theft, was of margin probative value and unduly prejudicial.

In

accordance, State v. DeAllo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), and
Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The Court compounded its error on the second defense counsel's
objection to evidence of prior apprehensions by stating at page 84
of the trial transcript: "Well the answer is already on the record.
The objection is overruled."

A judge could have, and should have

instructed

the jury to disregard

the answer and sustained

the

objection.

The Court in Pearce also admonished the trial judge for

failing to make a distinction to the jury, and by overruling an
objection

to testimony.

The Court, in analyzing

whether

the

admitted testimony had a substantial influence in bringing about
the verdict stated: "The jury's verdict could well have been the
result of shifting it's attention away from the facts of the case
22

11

The

prosecutor's

misleading

questions

inference

and

the

that

was

witnesses

raised

by

the

answers

that

Defendant/Appellant was connected with a prior convicted cattle
rustler, definitely creates undue prejudice which outweighed the
evidences minor probative value.

Since very little other direct

evidence was introduced indicating the cattle came from the Robbers
Roost Allotment evidence of prior reports and apprehensions from
said

Allotment

compounded

the

prejudicial

affect,

and

was

a

substantial influence in bringing about the verdict.1

V.

Improper Admission of Evidence and Improper Remarks by the

Prosecutor of Prior Bad Acts and Offenses:

At page 115 of the

Trial Transcript the prosecution submitted Exhibits Four and Five
into

evidence

Exhibits

were

over
the

Defendant/Appellant's

basis

of

a

forgery

objection.

and

uttering

These
of

false

documents charge that was dismissed by the Circuit Court.
responding
Evidence,

to

Defendant/Appellant's

the prosecution

stated

Motion

it will

to

Suppress

In
Said

not be submitted

as

The Court should keep in mind the only direct evidence
submitted by the prosecution of where the cattle came from was that
they were skinny and there was red sand on them. The alleged owner
never even saw the cattle, and that the lay opinions of the
prosecution witnesses were based on hearsay.
2

Upon my review of the Court record in this case, the Court
should be put on notice that the Exhibits appear to have been mismarked and are incomplete. Defendant/Appellant's Exhibit Number
Nine is missing, Exhibits Three and Six are missing, but what the
transcript refers to as Exhibits Four and Five are marked Exhibits
Three and Four. Exhibit Seven has been marked Exhibit Five and a
copy that is also marked as Exhibit Six.
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evidence of bad character.

See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion

to Suppress at pages 118 and 119 of the Record.
The

preceding

testimony

of

Mr.

Argyle

had

indicated

Defendant/Appellant purporting to be a friend of himself stated
that the cattle were obtained by trade with the Indians.
Transcript, page 113.

See Trial

Therefore the introduction of Exhibits Four

and Five indicated to the jury that Defendant/Appellant may have
been of bad character, by changing his story as to the origin of
the cattle and by forging Bills of Sale.
compounded

This indication was

further by the improper remarks in the prosecutorfs

closing statements that "not only is he guilty of this crime, but
he is guilty of other crimes."

See supplement to Motion for New

Trial, paragraph five, at page 251 of the record.
arguments are limited

Since closing

to matters that have been presented to the

jury, the prosecutor must have been referring to the allegedly
forged Bills of Sale that were introduced as Exhibits Four and
Five, or the prior conviction of Don Hatch that Defendant/Appellant
was rumored to be an accomplice with.
In State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d, 1368

(Utah 1986), the Court

reversed and remanded a conviction based on improper prosecutorfs
argument that referred to prior convictions and that demonstrated
Defendant's criminal character. The Court cited State v. Troy, 688
P.2d, 483 (Utah 1984), which case in turn applied the two prong
test set forth in State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973).

The

two prong test is whether the remarks called to the attention of
the jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering
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in determining their verdict, and that under circumstances of the
particular case the jury was probably influenced by those remarks.
The Prosecutor's remark that Defendant/Appellant was guilty
of other crimes would definitely not be permissible for the jury
to consider in determining it's verdict as being violative of Rule
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Given the weak

direct

evidence of ownership of the cattle in question, and no evidence
of the time of the alleged theft of the cattle, the Prosecutor's
remarks probably did influence the jury by bringing their attention
to

a

prior

criminal

conviction

of

cattle

rustling

Defendant/Appellant was apparently an accomplice.

in

which

When applying

the second prong of the test, the Court in Tarafa stated, "the
substantive use of Defendant's prior bad acts and felonies added
greatly to the likelihood that the jury inferred guilty knowledge
from the character

of Defendant."

The Court

in Troy

similar to this case where there was not compelling

stated,
proof of

Defendant's guilty, and that the jury could have found either way,
that they are compelled to find that the second step of the Valdez,
test has been met.

The

remarks of the Prosecutor.

jurors

"Probably were

influenced

by"

Similarly to those cases, the improper

remarks of the Prosecutor and the introduction of Bills of Sale
that

were

allegedly

forged

or

altered

could

probably

have

influenced the jury and is grounds for a reversal of the conviction
in this matter.
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides "evidence
of other claims, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
25

character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith."

In State v. Sanders, 699 P.2d 738, (Utah 1985), the

court stated,
Evidence of prior crimes is presumed prejudicial and,
absent no reason for the admission of the evidence other
than to settle criminal disposition, the evidence is
excluded.
See State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015, (Utah 1978), where the Court
stated, "Specific instances of misconduct that did not result in
criminal convictions are inadmissible to impeach the witness."
Evidence of a prior dismissed criminal complaint that followed
testimony which was contradictory as to the origin of the cattle,
and referred to as guilt of other crimes by the Prosecutor in his
closing arguments, was a blatant attack on Defendant/Appellant's
character, and in violation of Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.

VI.

Jury

Bias

and

improper

Conduct:

The

trial

judge

conducted its own voir dire of the jury, and at page 49 of the
Trial Transcript, upon defense counsel's suggestion, the Court
asked

the

witnesses,

Prosecutor
and

then

and

asked

defense
if the

between any of those witnesses.
jury.

counselor

to

jurors had

any

state

their

relationship

There was no response from the

Defendant/Appellant's counsel learned after the trial that

one of the jurors had in fact worked for one of the key witnesses
in the case, A. C. Ekker, and that another juror had previously
been a law enforcement officer who had actually arrested one of the
witnesses in the case, Don Hatch, for the identical offense for

26

which this Defendant was found guilty.

See Defendant/Appellantfs

Supplement for Motion for New Trial, paragraph three at page 250
of the record.
motion

that

information

The Defendant/Appellant's counsel states in said

had

voir

dire

disclosed,

been

he would

properly

conducted,

have asserted

his

and

that

pre-emptory

challenge or challenge for cause on at least one if not both of
those jurors.

Defendant was ready to put on evidence concerning

the bias of the jurors but was not allowed to.
Motion for New Trial, etc., page 35.
addressed

See Transcript of

This issue was not even

in the Findings of FAct and Order Denying Motion in

Arrest for Judgment and Motion for a New Trial found at page 257259 of the record.
One of the fundamental principles of our system of justice
which

is guaranteed

by both the United

States and Utah

State

Constitutions, is the right of an accused to a fair and impartial
jury.

Due process also requires proper conduct of the

judge, jury, and counsel during trial.

In addition to the bias of

two of the jurors mentioned above, some of the jurors apparently
were friendly with A. C. Ekker and conversed with him during one
of the recesses of the trial.

See Trial Transcript page 302 and

Supplement to Motion for New Trial, paragraph three, at page 250
of the record.
In State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d

799

(Utah, 1977), the Court

stated that a showing of friendship between two jurors and the main
prosecution witness was a sufficient showing of actual bias.
State

v.

Errickson,

674

P.2d

(Utah,
27

1987),

the

Court

In

stated

reversal

of

conviction

required where

and

a four or

remand

of case

for

five minute conversation

between juror and key witness for state. . ."
Pike,

712 P. 2d 277

(Utah

new

1985),

it was

trial
took

was

place

And in State v.

stated:

"conversation

between important prosecution witness, . . . was sufficient to
warrant

a presumption

of prejudice on the part of the

jurors

justifying reversal of conviction, even if jurors had denied they
influenced by the encounter in a Post Trial Hearing."

Finally in

State

the

v.

Velasquez,

672

P.2d

1254

(Utah,

1983),

Court

reiterated the general rule that Defendant is entitled to fair and
impartial trial based on evidence presented to jury, without jury
being influenced by information from outside sources."

These line

of cases show there is a high degree of protection concerning jury
bias and misconduct.

This coupled with the argument why grounds

exist for a change of venue and the prosecutions very weak evidence
concerning

ownership

of

the

cattle, requires

reversal

of the

conviction.

VII.

Unconstitutionality of Section 76-6-412:

This Statute

places theft of animals regardless of their value as a third degree
felony.

Although

in historical times theft

of

livestock

was

considered a much more serious crime and there were compelling
reasons

for

creating

a

special

class

for

such

thefts,

Defendant/Appellant contends those conditions no longer exists, and
to continue to classify theft of livestock as a third degree felony
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is

creating

a

class

that

is

unreasonable,

arbitrary

and

discriminatory.
The evidence of this case show that there are modern day
protections, i.e. the Brand Inspectors Office, that negates the
need for a special classification for a theft such as this.

The

test of a Statute for purposes of equal protection is that the
Statute must be grounded upon a rational basis, McGowan v. Marilyn,
366 U.S. 420, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 6L Ed. 2d 393 (1961).

There is not

a rational basis for distinguishing between a theft of a cow from
a barn, for example, and theft of a piece of equipment from the
barn of comparable value.

The standard for finding the value of

personal property and determine the degree of theft is the market
value of the stolen items.
1977).

State v. Logan, 563 P. 2d 811 (Utah,

There is no longer a rational basis for classifying theft

of livestock as a third degree felony regardless of value, whereas
all other types of theft are categorized on the basis of value.
Although this issue was addressed and denied in State v. Clark, 632
P.2d 841 (Utah, 1981), Defendant/Appellant contends that given the
modern safeguards that apply to the livestock industry, there no
longer

exists

a

rational

basis

for

the

discriminatory

classification, and State v. Clark should be overruled.

VIII.

Requirement of Original:

The State's exhibits three

and six were admitted, over Defendant/Appellant's objection, even
though they were admittedly copies of the original, and the witness
testified that the originals were easily obtainable.
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See Trial

Transcript pages 110 and 111.

The witness stated in response to

the prosecutors question if he had access to the originals that:
"They have allowed me to do it.

I could get a Court Order if I

needed to, but the Auction Company allowed me to and they helped
me find them in fact." (id. page 111 lines 2 through 5 ) .
Rule 1002 of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires to prove the
content of a witting the original is required.

Exceptions to this

rule are contained in Rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, but
none of those exceptions apply, in fact, the witness testified he
could have easily obtained the original.

Further there was no

authentication of who made the copies elicited from the witness.
If the Court finds the admission of this evidence was error, but
of no prejudicial affect, the combined affect of this error with
all others argued in this brief warrants a reversal.
IX.

Insufficiency of and Variance of Information:

Not only

was there little direct evidence as to the ownership of the cattle
or where it was taken, but the State also failed to provide
evidence as to when the cattle were allegedly taken.

direct

Although

Defendant/Appellant concedes the exact time need not be specific,
Defendant/Appellant contends that there is a violation of his due
process rights to not have the State prove with some degree of
specificity the approximately time of taking. This is particularly
true in light of the fact that Defendant/Appellant filed a Notice
of Alibi indicating that he was not in the area prior to the
alleged time of taking.
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In McGuire v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321, (Utah 1983), the Court
stated,
time is always an essential element of a crime in the
sense that due process requires that an accused be given
sufficient precise notification of the date of the
alleged crime that he can prepare his defense.
The Court cited the United States Constitution Amendments V and
XIV.

When there was weak evidence of direct ownership, weak

evidence as to where the cattle came from, and a Notice of Alibi
filed with the Court, (see Notice of Alibi, pages 75-78 of the
Record), the information was fatally defective for not setting
forth the time of taking, and the State failed to prove said time
during the trial.

Such failure of proof warrants reversal of

Defendant/Appellantf s conviction.
Defendant/Appellant was also severely prejudiced by the State
alleging in the information that the owner of the cattle was A. C.
Ekker, when proof at trial indicated ownership of the cattle was
really in a corporation called the Cross X Cattle Company.

The

defense had hired an investigator to investigate A. C. Ekker, not
Cross X Cattle Company.
for New Trial, etc.

See page 5 of the Transcript for Motion

In State v. Burnett, 712 P2d. 260 (Utah, 1985)

involved a very similar situation where evidence showed that the
theft was from someone other than that charged in the information.
The Court said there plainly was a variance between the specifics
of the crime charged in the information and the crime which the
Court permitted the jury to convict.

The Court reversed, stating

the defense was not put on notice of the ownership and therefore
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was prejudiced in the preparation of the defense.

This was the

argument the Motion For Arrest of Judgment, and said argument is
set forth on pages 6, 7 and 8 of the Transcript denying

said

motion.

X.

Separate Offenses:

Defendant/Appellant was charged with

8 separate counts of theft of cattle, although the Prosecution
failed to put on any evidence of different facts or elements of
proof

for each

addressed

count.

Multiplicity

has not been

extensively

in the Utah Courts, however, the Kansas Courts have

reviewed and defined the term.

In State v. Wilson, 728 P.2d 1332,

(Kan. App. 1986) , the Court stated:

"multiplicity in criminal

action is charging of single offense in several counts."

State v.

Jackson, 543 P.2d 901, (Kan. 1975), the Court stated: "test to be
applied

in determining the identity

requires proof of fact which

of offenses is whether it

is not required by others."

accord, see State v. Pierce, 469 P.2d 308 (Kan. 1970).

In

This test

was further refined in State v. Hicks, 714 P. 2d 105, (Kan. App.
1986), where the Court stated:
test
to determine
whether
charges
are
in
fact
multiplicitious is whether one offense requires proof of
element not necessary to prove other offenses; if so,
charges stemming from single act are not multipicitious.
Finally, the Kansas Appellant Court stated in State v. Hill,706
P.2d 472, (Kan. App.1985),
Multiplicity which is charging of a single offense in
several counts is prohibited because a single wrongful
act cannot furnish basis for more than one criminal
prosecution.
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Section 76-1-401 Utah Code Ann. states:
single criminal episode means all conduct which is
closely related in time and is significant to an attempt
or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
In State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203, (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
retention of stolen property of different individuals
is a single act and a single offense where evidence shows
that the items were retained simultaneously.
The

Supreme

Court

reversed

a

conviction

on

the

grounds

that

Defendant had previously been tried for the same criminal episode,
and the Court undertook a thorough review of opinions concerning
the issue of whether a single criminal episode or separate offenses
occurred.

The Court cited State v. Clark, 497 P.2d

1210, (Or.

1972), where that Court states:
if the State contended that the articles were received
or concealed by the Defendant on separate occasions, it
was incumbent upon it to offer evidence to that affect.
It did not do so.
The Utah Court in Bair concluded the State did not establish that
Defendant

received

the

stolen property

on

separate

occasions.

Similarly here, there was no evidence that the cattle was taken at
different times in fact, as argued

infra, the State failed to

specifically allege the date of taking.
Defendant/Appellant

is

prejudiced

by

being

charge

with

multiple counts, and thereby face up to 8 times the amount of fines
and

amount

of

possible

Defendant/Appellant

jail

time.

in his Motion

This

to Allege

was
One

argued

Third

by

Degree

Felony, (see Record, pages 90-93) and in his Motion to Dismiss made
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at trial, at page 155 of the Trial Transcript.

There it was

pointed out that the same Prosecutor had previously prosecuted
and

assisted

in

the

conviction

of

a

witness

of

Defendant/Appellant, Don Hatch, and in that case, there were 7 head
of cattle taken, only one count charged.

Defense counsel also

points out on page 156 that historically every record in that
particular County contained only one charge.

Grounds exist for a

reversal or at least a remand of this matter to be properly tried
under one count in absence of proof of separate facts or elements.
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CONCLUSION

Defendant/Appellant's
evidence,

innuendo,

and

conviction
as

a result

was
of

based

a biased

on

heresay

jury.

The

prosecution did not prove where the cattle were taken, when the
cattle were taken, or who the cattle were taken from.

The only

slim evidence of where the cattle were taken was the mere presence
of red sand on the cattle, and the alleged victim never even saw
the cattle.

Evidence as to prior apprehensions and reports of

cattle thefts
before

the

from the alleged

jury,

and

the

victim was

jury

improperly

improperly

inferred

admitted
that

the

conviction of Don Hatch, who was rumored to be an accomplice with
Defendant/Appellant, meant Defendant/Appellant must be guilty. For
these

reasons, plus

other

arguments

set

forth

in

the

brief,

Defendants conviction should be reversed.
In

the

conviction

event
is

this

Court

appropriate,

does

the

not

feel

following

reversal

reasons

of

the

constitutes

grounds for at least a remand of the matter and a new trial.
Defendant/Appellant was improperly charged and sentenced with 8
counts of cattle theft, rather than a single count; heresay, lay
opinion, and evidence without foundation was improperly admitted
over objection; jurors conversed with the witness during the course
of

the

proceedings;

and

improper

prejudiced Defendant/Appellant.
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remarks

by

the

prosecution

As argued above, numerous sound reasons exist for reversal of
Defendant/Appellant's conviction, or in the very least, a remand
for a new trial before an unbiased jury.

Respectively submitted this

QX day of

^-^ Lb^Uu &/-^ ^ > 1990,

Phil Hansen
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

36
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a true
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Phil Hansen
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ADDENDUM

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provision* concerning —
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, ur in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the ntfht to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury ot the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — P u n i s h m e n t ]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. ICitizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
4. (Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be
paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law —
Equal protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
ISM

Sec. 9.

[Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines
shall not be imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary ngor.
1SS6

8ec. 12. [Rights of a c c u s e d persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his
own behali, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himseii, a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her busband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the sam* offense.
list

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation
am

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment,
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61,
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a
new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and con*
elusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,
and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court,
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or
abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of Ihe jury, and whenever any
one or more of the jurors have been induced to
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the
court, by resort to a determination by chance or
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for
the party making the application, which he could
not, with reabonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of
panbion or prejudice
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial
shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry
of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1),
(2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit.
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be
served may be extended for an additional period not
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The
court may permit reply affidavits.
id) On initiative of c o u r t Not later than 10 days
after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative
may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party,
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

78-13-9. Grounds.
The court may, on motion, change the place of trial
in the following cases:
(1) when the county designated in the complaint is not the proper county.
(2) when there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had in the county, city, or
precinct designated in the complaint.
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the
ends of justice would be promoted by the change.
(4) when all the parties to an action, by stipulation or by consent in open court entered in the
minutes, agree that the place of trial may be
changed to another county. Thereupon the court
must order the change as agreed upon.
itos

76-6-412.

Theft — Classification of offenses —
Action for treble damages against receiver of stolen property.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in
this chapter shall be punishable as follows:
(a) As a felony of the second degree if:
(i) The value of the property or services
exceeds $1,000; or
(ii) The property stolen is a firearm or an
operable motor vehicle; or
(iii) The actor is armed with a deadly
weapon at the time of the theft; or
(iv) The property is stolen from the person
of another.
(b) As a felony of the third degree if:
(i) The value of the property or services is
more than $250 but not more than $1,000; or
(ii) The actor has been twice before convicted of theft of property or services valued
at $250 or less; or
(iii) When the property taken is a stallion,
mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox,
bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny,
swine, or poultry.
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value of
the property stolen was more than $100 but does
not exceed $250.
(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value of
the property stolen was $100 or less.
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation
of Subsection (1), of Section 76-6-408 may bring an
action against any person mentioned in (d) for three
times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained
by the plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.
ii77
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76-1-401.

"Single criminal e p i s o d e " defined —
J o i n d e r of offense* and defendants.
In this part unless the context requires a different
definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to
an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or
modify the effect of Section 77-21-31 in controlling
the joinder of olfenses and defendants in criminal proceedings.
1976
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-35-17. Rule 17 — The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right
appear and defend in person and by counsel. The
fendant shall be personally present at the trial
ith the following exceptions:
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and in*
fractions, defendant may consent in writing to
trial in his absence;
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable
by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from
the trial after notice to defendant of the time for
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried
and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall
have the same effect as if defendant had been
present; and
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause shown which may
include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct.
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may
'quite the perbonal attendance of the defendant at
ie trial
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be
*ied in the following order:
(1) Misdemeanor cases when defendant is in
custody;
(2) Felony cases when defendant is in custody;
(3) Felony cases when defendant is on bail or
recognizance; and
(4) Misdemeanor cases when defendant is on
bail or recognizance.
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the
L'fendant waives a jury in open court with the aproval of the court and the consent of the prosecution.
id) All other cases shall be tried without a jury
nless the defendant makes written demand at least
*n days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise,
o jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction.
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial
try shall be as specified in Section 78-46-5.
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may,
ith the consent of the accused and the approval of
ie court, by stipulation in writing or made orally in
>en court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in
-ogress with any number of jurors less than otherise required.

(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn,
the trial shall proceed in the following order:
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the
defendant stated;
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an
opening statement and the defense may make an
opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has rested;
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge;
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case;
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause,
otherwise permits;
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any
other appropriate time, the court shall instruct
the jury, and
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury
on either side or on both sides without argument,
the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close
by responding to the defense argument. The
court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each party and the time to be
allowed for argument.
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified
during trial and an alternate juror has been selected,
the case shall proceed using the alternate juror. If no
alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate
to proceed with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial
ordered.
(I) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for
the jury to view the place in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, or in which any
other material fact occurred, it may order them to be
conducted in a body under the charge of an officer to
the place, which shall be shown to them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person
so appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on
any subject connected with the trial and to return
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them into court without unnecessary delay or at a
specified time
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors
are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they
shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty
not to converse among themselves or to converse
with, or sufler themselves to be addressed by, any
other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon
until the case is finally submitted to them.
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may
take with them the instructions of the court and all
exhibits and papers which have been received as evidence, except depositions, and each juror may also
take with him any notes of the testimony or other
proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any
other person
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury,
they shall be kept together in some convenient place
under charge of an officer until they agree upon a
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by
the court Except by order of the court, the officer
having them under his charge shall not allow any
communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them if they have agreed upon
their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is
rendered, communicate to any person the state of
their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon
(m) After the jury hab retired for deliberation, if
they desire to be informed on any point of law arising
in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of
them, who shall communicate such request to the
court The court may then direct that the jury be
brought before the court where, in the presence of the
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond
to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given Such response shall be recorded The court may in its discretion respond to the
inquiry in writing without having the jury brought
before the court, in which case the inquiry and response thereto shall be entered in the record.
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on
its face, it may be corrected by the jury under the
advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again.
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all of the evidence, the
court may issue an order dismissing any information
or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground
that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish
the offense charged therein or any lesser included
offense.
iwt
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7-35-18. Rule 18
Selection of jury.
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number
f the jurors that are to try the cause plus such an
idditional number as will allow for all peremptory
hallenges permitted. After each challenge for cause
ustained, another juror shall be called to Till the vaancy before further challenges are made, and any
uch new juror may be challenged for cause. When
he challenges for cause are completed, the clerk
hall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each
ide, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate
hereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a
mie in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all
>eremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The
lerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many
>f them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, in
he order in which they appear on the list, and the
Ksraons whose names are so called shall constitute
he jury.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant
o conduct the examination of the prospective jurors
>r may itaelf conduct the examination. In the latter
;vent, the court may permit counsel or the defendant
o supplement the examination by such further in[uiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit to the
irospective jurors additional questions requested by
ounsel or the defendant.
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an
^dividual juror.
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve
at a particular court or for the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection made to all jurors summoned and may be
taken by either party.
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded
only on a material departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection,
drawing, summoning and return of the
panel.
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be
taken before the jury is sworn and shall be in
writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall
specifically set forth the facts constituting
the grounds of the challenge.
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed
by the adverse party, a hearing may be had
to try any question of fact upon which the
challenge is based. The jurors challenged,
and any other persons, may be called as witnesses at the hearing thereon.
(iv) The court shall decide the challenge.
If the challenge to the panel is allowed, the
court shall discharge the jury so far as the
trial in question is concerned. If a challenge
is denied, the court shall direct the selection
of jurors to proceed.

(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be
either peremptory or for cause. A challenge to an
individual juror may be made only before the
jury is sworn to try the action, except the court
may, for good cause, permit it to be made alter
the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence
is presented. In challenges for cause the rules
relating to challenges to a panel and hearings
thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause
shall be taken first by the prosecution and then
by the defense.
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given. In capital
cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to
four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases,
each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges.
If there is more than one defendant the court may
allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or
jointly.
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be taken on one or more of the
following grounds:
(1) Want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law;
(2) Any mental or physical infirmity which
renders one incapable of performing the duties of
a juror;
(3) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth
degree to the person alleged to be injured by the
offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted;
(4) The existence of any social, legal, business,
fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the
defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively, would auggeat to reasonable minds that
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of
favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision
thereof;
(6) Having been or being the party adverse to
the defendant in a civil action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in
a criminal prosecution;
(6) Having served on the grand jury which
found the indictment;
(7) Having served on a trial jury which has
tried another person for the particular offense
charged;
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(8) Having been one of a jury formally sworn
to try the same charge, and whose verdict was set
aside, or which was discharged without a verdict
after the case was submitted to it;
(9) Having served as a juror in a civil action
brought against the defendant for the act
charged as an offense;
(10) If the offense charged is punishable with
death, the entertaining of such conscientious
opinions about the death penalty as would preclude the juror from voting to impose the death
penalty following conviction regardless of the
facts;
(11) Because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or interested in carrying
on any buniness, calling or employment, the carrying on of which is a violation of law, where the
defendant is charged with a like offense;
(12) Because he has been a witness, either for
or against the defendant on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury;
(13) Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to whether the defendant
is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or
(14) That a state of mind exists on the part of
the juror with reference to the cause, or to either
party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial
rights of the party challenging; but no person
shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded
upon public rumor, statements in public journals
or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears
to the court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly
upon the matter to be submitted to him.
(0 Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by
the prosecution and then by the defense alternately.
Challenges for cause shall be completed before peremptory challenges are taken.
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be
impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the order in which
they are called, shall replace jurors, who are, or become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties.
The prosecution and defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen.
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications,
take the same oath and enjoy the same privileges a*
regular jurors.
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is
a privilege of the person exempted and is not a
ground for challenge for cause.
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurorB, in substance, that they and
each of them will well and truly try the matter in
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77-35-19. Rule 1»
Instruction*.
(a) At the clone of the evidence or at such earlier
time as the court reasonably directs, any party may
file written request that the court instruct the jury on
the law as set forth in the request. At the same time
copies of such requests shall be furnished to the other
parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed
action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel
with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the
parties stipulate that such instructions may be given
orally, or otherwise waive this requirement.
(b) Upon each written request so presented and
given, or refused, the court shall endorse its decision
and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the
endorsement what part of the charge was given and
what part was refused.
(cj No party may assign as error any portion of the
charge or omission therefrom unless he objects
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly
the matter to which he objects and the ground of his
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object,
error may be assigned to instructions in order to
avoid a manifest injustice.
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in
the case, and if the court refers to any of the evidence,
it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive
judges of all questions of fact.
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be
made after the court has instructed the jury. Unless
otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon tim«
for argument shall be within the discretion of the
court.
IMO

77-36-24. Rule 24 — Motion for n e w trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had
a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a
party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in
support of the motion. If additional time is required to
procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone
the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems
reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within
10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such
further time as the court may fix during the ten day
period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in
the same position as if no trial had been held and the
former verdict shall not be URPII nr m«»nt irk™**rf «*;*k<*-
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77-35-29.

Rule 29 — Disability a n d disqualification of a judge or change of venue,

(e) (i) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes that a fair and impartial trial
cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the action is pending, either may, by motion, supported
by an affidavit setting foith facts, ask to have the
trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction.
(ii) If the court te satisfied that the representations made in the affidavit are true and justify
transfer of the case, the court shall enter an order
for tiie removal of the case to the court of another
jurisdiction free from the objection and all
records pertaining to the case shall be transferred forthwith to the court in the other county.
If the court is not satisfied that the representations so made justify transfer of the case, the
court shall either enter an order denying the
transfer or order a formal hearing in court to
resolve the matter and receive further evidence
with respect to the alleged prejudice.
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Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; i r r e l e v a n t evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in
courts of this state Evidence which is not relevant is
not admissible
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on
g r o u n d s of prejudice, confusion, or
w a s t e of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence

Rule 404. C h a r a c t e r evidence not admissible to
prove conduct; exceptions;
other
crimes.
(hi Other crimes, w r o n g s , o r acts. Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
piove the character oi n person in order to show that
he dUed in conformity therewith It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident

Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b)
helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or
the determination of a fact in issue.

Rule 602. H e a r s a y rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by
law or by these rules

